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Abstract 
This chapter outlines progress in the delimitation of maritime boundaries and some of the problems 
relating to overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction. It is contended that the incomplete nature of the 
maritime political map of the world is problematic, in particular because lack of delimitation inevitably 
equates to jurisdictional uncertainty and this is highly likely to be detrimental to maritime security. 
Alternatives to maritime boundary delimitation - cooperative mechanisms in areas of overlapping 
jurisdiction - are then addressed, including their emerging applicability to maritime security issues as well 
as the Southeast Asian experience. 
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COOPERATIVE MECHANISMS AND 
MARITIME SECURITY IN AREAS OF 




This chapter outlines progress in the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries and some of the problems relating to overlapping claims to 
maritime jurisdiction. It is contended that the incomplete nature of the 
maritime political map of the world is problematic, in particular because 
lack of delimitation inevitably equates to jurisdictional uncertainty and 
this is highly likely to be detrimental to maritime security. Alternatives 
to maritime boundary delimitation -  cooperative mechanisms in areas 
of overlapping jurisdiction -  are then addressed, including their 
emerging applicability to maritime security issues as well as the 
Southeast Asian experience.
Progress Maritime Boundary Delimitation
The mosaic of international maritime boundaries around the world's 
oceans is profoundly incomplete. The need for such boundaries is 
longstanding but has increased markedly in step with the tremendous 
increase in the maritime space coming under the jurisdiction of coastal 
states in the post-World War II period. Indeed, it has been calculated 
that as much as 44.5% of the oceans could be subject to some national 
claim to maritime jurisdiction were every coastal state to claim a full 
200 nautical mile (nm) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and advance 
claims to extended continental shelf jurisdiction beyond 200nm where 
applicable.1
1 J.R.V. Prescott and C.H. Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2005), chapters 2 and 10.
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As a consequence of the significant spatial extension of coastal state 
claims offshore, particularly as a consequence of the enthusiastic 
adoption of 200nm EEZ claims around the world, there has been a 
proliferation in the number of potential maritime boundaries worldwide. 
Inevitably a profusion of overlapping jurisdictional claims and offshore 
boundary disputes have also emerged as states seek to secure the 
maximum maritime entitlements for themselves. The international law 
rules governing the delimitation of maritime boundaries laid down in 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) provide 
only minimalist guidance as to how such disputes may be resolved, 
particularly in respect of the broad resource-oriented national zones of 
sovereign rights, the continental shelf and EEZ.
While Article 15 dealing with the delimitation of the territorial sea 
favours equidistance as a method of delimitation, unless the States 
concerned agree otherwise or there exists an "historic title or other special 
circumstances" in the area to be delimited, this is not the case for the 
continental shelf and EEZ.2 For the EEZ and continental shelf, LOSC 
Articles 74 and 83 respectively use the same general language, calling 
for agreement to be reached on the basis of international law in order to 
achieve "an equitable solution".3 No preferred method of delimitation 
is indicated and thus the LOSC's 'rules', if one can term them that, on 
delimitation are open to wildly conflicting interpretation. Additionally, 
sovereignty disputes, especially over islands, have complicated matters 
and made a number of conflicting claims to maritime space extremely 
hard to resolve.
Of an estimated 427 potential maritime boundaries around the 
world, only about 168 (39%) have been formally agreed. Many of these 
have been settled only partially, that is, the settlement is incomplete in 
terms of boundary length and/or functionally in respect of the maritime
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2 The Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) (United Nations, New York, 1983), Article 
15.
3 Ibid., Articles 74 and 83.
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zones delimited, for instance seabed only but not water column.4 In terms 
of the number and complexity of overlapping jurisdictional and 
sovereignty claims, Southeast Asian waters are perhaps the most 
disputed regional seas the world over. These claims are complicated by 
the presence of territorial disputes over islands and have been 
exacerbated by increasing concerns over securing maritime resources, 
especially oil and gas. Less than half of the potential maritime boundaries 
in Southeast Asia have been even partially resolved, leaving substantial 
zones of overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction. Is this a problem 
and why should the resolution of, or at least management of, these 
competing claims be a priority?
The Purpose and Value of Maritime Boundaries
It can be contended that the delimitation of maritime boundaries 
provides clarity and certainty to all maritime states and users, helps to 
minimise the risk of friction and conflict by eliminating a source of bi- 
and multilateral dispute and removes barriers to cooperation, thus 
enhancing the potential for cooperative maritime enforcement and 
enhanced maritime security. Greater compliance with international 
obligations with respect to jurisdiction, security and freedom of 
navigation can have direct and tangible benefits to the states involved 
as well as other maritime users. The facilitation of common approaches 
to maritime jurisdiction and legislation can thus lead to enhanced
4 Prescott and Schofield, Maritime Political Boundaries, chapter 10. Based on US Department 
of State figures updated by the author. See, United States Department of State, 'Maritime 
Boundaries of the World', Limits in the Seas, No. 108 (Bureau of Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Washington D.C., 1988). This analysis was allied to 
the review of agreements contained in the International Maritime Boundaries series. This 
figure excludes the seven potential boundaries of the Caspian Sea, which for this analysis 
are not considered to be maritime boundaries, as well as potential 'boundaries' between 
coastal states and the International Sea Bed Authority concerning the outer limit of the 
continental shelf. Additionally, multiple delimitations relating to the same maritime 
boundary situation are excluded as are internal delimitations such as those amongst the 
Emirates that now make up the UAE. See J.I. Chamey and L.M. Alexander (eds.), 
International Maritime Boundaries, vols. I and II (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1993); J.I. 
Chamey and L.M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, vol. Ill, (Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1998); J.I. Chamey and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime 
Boundaries, vol. IV (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2002); and R.W. Smith and D. Colson, 
(eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, vol. V (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2005).
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economic security. Additionally, maritime delimitation can also facilitate 
the sustainable management and preservation of important ocean 
resources.
Conversely, lack of delimitation often equates to extensive 
overlapping claims to jurisdiction and this situation tends to exacerbate 
management problems. Within such contested zones, access to seabed 
resources potentially crucial to the well-being and political stability of 
the coastal states involved is prevented. Similarly, with regard to 
significant living resources, competing claims can lead to -uncoordinated 
policies and potentially destructive and unsustainable competition and 
friction between rival states which have the potential to escalate into 
political and even military confrontation.
Furthermore, overlapping claims undermine maritime security as 
the LOSC, and coastal states themselves, tends to favour exclusively 
national maritime enforcement measures, in spite of the way in which 
the marine environment transcends national maritime claims and 
boundaries.5 It can be argued that overlapping claims areas represent 
potential lacunae in maritime enforcement as, where jurisdiction is 
contested, it follows that surveillance and enforcement will remain 
similarly uncertain, or at least ill coordinated.
Maritime boundary delimitation can therefore be viewed as 
essential to the full realisation of maritime security, the peaceful 
management of ocean resources and regional peace and prosperity. It is 
for these reasons that CSCAP has repeatedly argued in favour of the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries and resolution of maritime 
jurisdictional disputes, for example:
Maritime Boundary Delimitation
Boundary delimitation between opposite and/or adjacent 
States would assist cooperation to achieve law and order at 
sea. Regional States should move expeditiously to resolve 
existing boundary disputes to ensure that jurisdiction might 
properly be exercised in applicable zones. If boundaries 
cannot be resolved, economies should be prepared to enter
Cooperative Mechanisms and Maritime Security in Areas o f Overlapping
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5 B.H. Oxman, 'Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations', in Chamey and 
Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, vol. 1,2-40, at p. 4.
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into some form of provisional arrangements for the 
maintenance of law and order in the disputed area without 
prejudice to their positions in the boundary negotiations.6
Alternatives to Delimitation
Although maritime boundaries are the dominant means of governing 
and defining national claims to maritime jurisdiction and are clearly 
the type of management regime favoured by coastal states, it is clear 
that many overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction, especially those 
involving sovereignty disputes over islands of which there are numerous 
examples in the Asia-Pacific region, are likely to be extremely hard to 
resolve in the foreseeable future. In this context it is therefore worth 
considering alternatives to the delimitation of international boundaries 
and the adoption of cooperative mechanisms providing for shared rather 
than unilateral management of maritime space. The principle form of 
cooperative mechanism to emerge in the maritime context in recent years 
is maritime joint development zones.
The legal rationale for joint development is provided by LOSC 
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) dealing with the delimitation of the exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf respectively. These articles state, 
in identical terms, that:
Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the 
States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and 
cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this 
transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching 
of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without 
prejudice to the final delimitation,7
Joint development zones have attracted considerable enthusiasm from 
commentators as a means of overcoming seemingly intractable maritime 
boundary disputes. Where the parties concerned appear to be deadlocked 
and there appears to be little prospect of agreement on a boundary line 
in the foreseeable future, it has been argued that joint development
6 CSCAP Memorandum No.8.
7 UNCLOS, Articles 74(3) and 83(3).
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agreements seem to offer an ideal way forward, placing the focus 
squarely on "a fair division of the resources at stake, rather than on the 
determination of an artificial line".8
According to their advocates, maritime joint development affords 
the parties concerned the opportunity to retain their claims whilst 
simultaneously pushing forward with the development or management 
of the resources or environment involved without undue delay. The 
existence of 'without prejudice' clauses in this context provides an 
effective means by which sovereignty concerns can be sidestepped and 
legal concerns over compromising jurisdictional claims can be 
addressed. A good example of this type of clause is Article 4 dealing 
with the non-renunciation of claims in the Nigeria and Sao Tome and 
Principe treaty establishing a joint zone between them of 2001:
4.1 Nothing contained in this Treaty shall be interpreted as 
a renunciation of any right or claim relating to the whole or 
any part of the Zone by either State Party or as recognition 
of the other State Party's position with regard to any right 
or claim to the Zone or any part thereof.
4.2 No act or activities taking place as a consequence of this 
Treaty or its operation, and no law operating in the zone by 
virtue of this Treaty, may be relied on as a basis for 
asserting, supporting or denying tire position of either State 
Party with regard to rights or claims over the Zone or any 
part thereof.9
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8 E.L. Richardson, 'Jan Mayen in Perspective', American Journal of International Law, 82 
(1988), 443-458. See also S.P. Jagota, 'Maritime Boundary and Joint Development Zones: 
Emerging Trends', Ocean Yearbook, 10 (1993) 110-131; K. Lagoni, 'Interim Measures Pending 
Maritime Delimitation Agreements', American Journal of International Law, 78 (1984), 345-368; 
D. Ong, 'Southeast Asian State Practice on the Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Deposits', in Blake et al. (eds.), The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources (Graham 
and Trotman, London, 1995), 77-96; and M. Miyoshi, 'The Joint Development of Offshore 
Oil and Gas in Relation to Maritime Boundary Delimitation', Maritime Briefing, 2,, 5, 
(International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham, 1999).
9 'Treaty between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao 
Tome' and 'Principe on the Joint Development of Petroleum and other Resources, in 
respect of Areas of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the two States', (21 February 2001), 
Article 4 . For treaty text see; <www.un.org/Depts/los/legislationandtreaties.htm>
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In fact, these provisions are based on the British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law's (BIICL) pioneering work on drawing up a 'model' 
joint development agreement. The inclusion of the BIICL's draft 
provisions in a formal treaty establishing a joint zone represents a 
welcome and encouraging example of an academic or 'track-two' process 
having a clear impact on policy-making in the real world.10
Entering into a joint development arrangement can also be viewed 
as a cooperative approach rather than the potentially confrontational 
quest for a geographically precise and legally final and binding 
traditional boundary line. As a result cooperative mechanisms can be 
viewed as a means of conflict prevention and, ideally, as a form of 
confidence building mechanism. It has been observed that:
Such arrangements enable States to make use of the 
disputed areas and to conduct normal relations there. In 
the absence of such arrangements, State may feel compelled 
at some cost, to forcefully challenge each other's actions in 
the area to maintain their legal rights.11
The delimitation of a boundary line also raises concerns that the 
resources at stake may end up on the 'wrong' side of the line. This is 
often a consideration where seabed energy resources are at stake as the 
precise location of reserves is frequently not known until exploration 
starts in earnest and test wells are drilled. Joint development removes 
the need to define a boundary line and thus circumvents this problem -  
removing it as a potential deterrent to agreement.12
The alternate view is that it seems inappropriate to promote joint 
development simply on the basis that the contending parties to a dispute 
over overlapping maritime claims have proved unable to resolve their 
differences. It can also be argued that if joint zones are based on the
10 H. Fox (ed.), Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas (British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law, London, 1989).
11 J.I. Chamey, 'Progress in International Maritime Delimitation Law7, American Journal of 
International Lazo, 88 (1994), 227.
12 C.H. Schofield, 'Joint Development Zones: Constructive Solution or Complication?', in 
Ocean Management Related to Maritime Zones, Proceedings of Regional Symposium on 
Maritime Boundary Delimitation of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (St. 
Lucia, July 1996) 60-80.
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limits of such overlapping claims areas, as tends to be the case, then 
this serves to encourage and reward extreme unilateral maritime claims. 
Furthermore, the practical task of establishing and maintaining such 
potentially dauntingly complex arrangements should not be 
underestimated as this requires considerable political commitment from 
all parties as they do represent a significant challenge to state 
sovereignty. Indeed, it has been stated that:
The conclusion of any joint development arrangement, in 
the absence of the appropriate level of consent between the 
parties, is merely redrafting the problem and possibly 
complicating it further.13
In this context it is also reasonable to observe that if seabed resources 
are at stake, as is often the case, development of those resources is likely 
to take decades to realise. International oil companies demand political, 
legal and financial certainty before they make the multi-million dollar 
commitments that are required to pursue hydrocarbon exploration 
operations. Continuity is therefore a requirement which means that any 
cooperative mechanism must be founded on a strong bilateral political 
relationship and thus be able to survive a change in government in one 
or both states concerned.
These concerns are exacerbated by sensitivities over security 
cooperation. The parties may harbour fears over intelligence gathering 
by the 'other' side in the joint zone. This reinforces the point that political 
will remains a crucial factor in joint zones, just as it is in the realisation 
and subsequent management of a maritime boundary agreement.
Nevertheless, it is clear that emerging state practice appears to 
favour joint development arrangements and that such arrangements are 
in line with international law, including the LOSC. Joint development 
arrangements therefore do offer a flexible and practical way forward
Cooperative Mechanisms and Maritime Security in Areas o f Overlapping
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13 W.G. Stormont and I. Townsend-Gault, 'Offshore Petroleum Joint Development 
Arrangements: Functional Instrument? Compromise? Obligation?', in Blake et al. (eds.) 
The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources, (Graham and Trotman, London, 1995), 
52. Similarly, Jagota has noted that "sensitive security conditions in the area, 
incompatible political relations between the disputants, vertical or dependent economic 
relations, reluctance to transfer technology or to co develop [sic] technology, and other 
similar inconsistencies may generate resistance to joint development zones, with or 
without a maritime boundary." ('Maritime Boundary and Joint Development Zones', 
117).
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for states with seemingly intractable disputes over overlapping maritime 
claims with their neighbours. Furthermore, a number of precedents exist, 
including in the Southeast Asian and East Asian regional context.
Cooperative Mechanisms in Southeast Asia
Southeast and East Asia boasts considerable experience in terms of 
cooperative mechanisms and maritime joint development zones. The 
region hosts two joint zones which have been established in addition to 
the delimitation of a maritime boundary. These are the agreement 
concluded between Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) in 1978 
concerning the Torres Strait14 and China and Vietnam straddling their 
maritime boundary agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Gulf to 
China) of 25 December 2000.15 The former agreement is of particular 
note as it is complex and creative and provides an excellent example of a 
cooperative mechanism that, unlike many, is not focussed on seabed 
resources. The Torres Strait agreement was especially innovative in that 
within the protected zone, established with the aim of guarding 
traditional fishing activities and regulating the exploitation of 
commercial fisheries, separate continental shelf and fisheries 
boundaries were delimited. This feature of the agreement, coupled with 
its detailed regulatory regime addressed the 'problem' of existence of 
several Australian islands located near to the PNG coast and thus on 
the 'wrong' side of the median line between the two states' mainland 
coastlines. As a result of the dual boundary approach, these islands fall 
on the Australian side of the fisheries boundary but the PNG side of the 
continental shelf jurisdiction line.16 The Gulf of Tonkin agreement relates
14 'Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea 
Concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the Two 
Countries, including the Area Known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters', (18 December 
1978, entry into force 15 February 1985). For treaty text, see <www.un.org/DeptsAos/ 
legislationandtreaties.htm>.
15 Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Viet 
Nam on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, the Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf in Beibu Bay/Gulf of Tonkin (25 December 2000). For treaty text, see 
<www.un.org/DeptsAosAegislationandtreaties.htm>
16 C.FI. Schofield and M.A. Pratt, 'Cooperation in the Absence of Maritime Boundary 
Agreements: The Purpose and Value of Joint Development', in The Aegean Sea 2000, 
Proceedings of International Symposium on the Aegean Sea (Bodrum, Turkey, 5-7 May, 
2000), 152-164.
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to joint fisheries activities and was vital to securing agreement on 
delimitation of the two states' maritime boundary in that area.
Several other arrangements have also been established in the 
absence of maritime delimitation. These include the long-standing joint 
zone between Japan and South Korea in the East China Sea which was 
concluded in 1974. This agreement represents a classic example of a 
joint zone concerned with enabling seabed exploration activities to 
proceed where deadlock had been reached on continental shelf boundary 
negotiations.17 The Gulf of Thailand also hosts two fully-fledged 
cooperative arrangements, both concerned with seabed resources, 
between Malaysia and Thailand of 197918 and between Malaysia and 
Vietnam of 1992.19 The contrast between these two arrangements is 
stark. The Thai-Malaysian agreement is institutionally complex and took 
over 10 years to implement as a consequence of disputes over previously 
granted concessions as well as faltering political will.20 In contrast, the 
Malaysia-Vietnam agreement avoids regime-building in favour of a 
simple, practical arrangement facilitating resource exploitation through 
cooperation between the two states' national oil companies. In both cases 
costs and revenues are to be shared equally.21 Another joint arrangement 
within the Gulf of Thailand is that between Cambodia and Vietnam 
dating from 1972. This is a somewhat peculiar arrangement, dealing as 
it does with joint historic waters located within the two states' straight 
baseline claims. The joint development mosaic in the Gulf of Thailand 
also appears set to become yet more complex as Cambodia and Thailand
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17 Miyoshi, 'The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas', 12-14.
18 Memorandum of Understanding between the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia on 
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Boundary between the Two Countries in the 
Gulf of Thailand (24 October 1979, entry into force 15 July 1982). For treaty text, see 
<www.un.org/Depts/Ios/legislationandtreaties.htm>
19 Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam for the Exploration and Exploitation of Petroleum in a Defined Area of the 
Continental Shelf Involving the Two Countries (5 June 1992, entry into force 4 June 1993).
20 Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and (he Government of the 
Kingdom of Thailand on the Constitution and Other Matters Relating to the 
Establishment of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority (30 May 1990); Miyoshi, 'The 
Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas', 14-17. See also, Ong, 'Southeast Asian State 
Practice'.
21 Miyoshi, 'The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas', 21.
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signed a Memorandum of Understanding in June 2001. This accord 
commits them to delimitation in the northern part (above 11° N. latitude) 
of their large area of overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand, coupled 
with the establishment of a joint development zone to the south, although 
no formal agreement has yet been forthcoming.
Perhaps the most sophisticated maritime joint development zone 
developed around the world was the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation 
between Australia and Indonesia established through a Treaty signed 
in December 1989 with additional detailed regulations being added in 
1991. Covering an area of 60,500 km2 the Timor Gap arrangement was 
divided into three sub zones. The initial duration of the agreement was 
40 years, to be followed by successive terms of 20 years. The agreement 
became defunct, however, with Timor Leste's (East Timor) independence. 
The Timor Gap was a complex yet also highly innovative and 
comprehensive maritime joint development zone and many 
commentators have suggested that it represents a 'model' for joint 
development elsewhere around the world.22
On independence East Timor maintained that it was not bound by 
any of the agreements related to East Timor's territory entered into by 
Jakarta -  including the Timor Gap joint development zone. A 
breakthrough was made in 2002, however, when an interim arrangement, 
termed the Timor Sea Treaty (TST), was signed.23 The TST established 
a Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) which encompasses the 
central part of the old Australia-Indonesia joint zone. Unlike the other 
joint zones mentioned, sharing of revenues within the JPDA is unequal 
with East Timor set to receive a 90% share of government revenues 
therein. The TST entered into force in April 2003, allowing production 
of natural gas from the Baya-Undan field located within the JPDA from 
February 2004.24
22 Fox, Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas; and Miyoshi, 'The Joint Development of 
Offshore Oil and Gas', 17-20.
23 'Timor Sea Treaty' (Dili, 20 May 2002, entry into force 2 April 2003). For treaty text, 
see <www.un.org/DeptsAos/legislationandtreaties.htm>
24 C.H. Schofield, 'Dividing the Resources of the Timor Sea: A Matter of Life and Death 
for East Timor', Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27(2) (August 2005), 255-280.
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Additionally, a number of joint fisheries agreements have been 
established in East Asia. These include ones between China and Japan 
in the East China Sea of 11 November 1997, Japan and South Korea in 
the East China Sea and Sea of Japan (East Sea to Korea) of January 2000 
and China and South Korea in the Yellow Sea of 30 June 2001.25 These 
agreements emerged as a result of all three States ratifying the LOSC 
and claiming EEZs in 1996, resulting in overlapping entitlements and a 
renewed need for either maritime boundary delimitation or a mechanism 
to deal with their overlapping claims until such boundary agreements 
are put in place.
Together these agreements represent a significant step forward in 
cooperative management of shared resources and the establishment of 
a conflict avoidance architecture. All three agreements share the virtue 
that they are based on the LOSC regime, having stemmed from each 
state's EEZ claims. They are also based on shared interests and 
recognition of their mutual, functional requirement for cooperation in 
order to conserve and manage fisheries resources that are under severe 
pressure. Perhaps most significantly, the joint arrangements have helped 
to stabilise bilateral fisheries relations and reduce conflicts. The 
agreements also have the potential to act as confidence-building 
mechanisms in the longer term as bilateral contacts and relationships 
are being deepened through the establishment of joint institutions such 
as Joint Fisheries Committees. These cooperative mechanisms relating 
to fisheries have tended to encourage the promulgation of fresh 
enforcement legislation and even though enforcement takes place on a 
flag State basis, indirect enforcement cooperation is encouraged. These 
positive outcomes have proved achievable as a consequence of the 
provisional nature of the agreements which are without prejudice to final 
maritime boundary delimitation.
The joint fisheries zones in East Asia do have significant drawbacks. 
A key problem relates to their geographical scope. They are incomplete, 
covering only parts of East Asia's maritime space and lack an ecosystem-
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25 The China -  Japan agreement was signed on 11 November 1997 and entered into force 
on 1 June 2000; the South Korea -  Japan agreement entered into force in January 1999; and 
the China -  South Korea agreement entered into force on 30 June 2001. See S.P. Kim, 'The 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and New Fisheries Agreements in North East Asia', 
Marine Policy, 27 (2003), 97-109.
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wide approach. Indeed, there are large "current fishing patterns" zones 
where fishing is uncoordinated and unregulated. Another problematic 
issue is that there are overlaps between the various zones. Furthermore, 
enforcement is on a flag state basis with minimal joint enforcement 
envisaged and, crucially, there are no provisions for enforcement against 
third parties. The latter issue is especially problematic in the East China 
Sea where Taiwan is a party to none of the agreements, yet Taiwanese 
fishermen are very active in these waters. It is also worth observing that 
the agreements have themselves been a source of controversy, protests 
and dispute within the participating countries, often because of their 
perceived relationship to sovereignty disputes over islands.
Overall, however, the joint fisheries zones in the East Asia represent 
an encouraging migration of rhetoric on cooperation into practical joint 
management and cooperative enforcement and information sharing. As 
such, these bilateral mechanisms offer potential building blocks for 
regional agreement and multilateral approach to ocean management.26
Eleven cooperative mechanisms have therefore been negotiated 
throughout the region with a further joint zone currently subject to 
negotiations. This demonstrates that there is an abundance of 
enthusiasm, experience and capacity in Southeast and East Asia for 
cooperative mechanisms.
Cooperative Mechanisms and Maritime Security
How have issues of security, enforcement and criminal jurisdiction been 
handled in joint development zones in the absence of delimitation? 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, most maritime joint development zones have 
been inspired by the desire to gain access to or manage resources, 
especially seabed resources. The provisions of such agreements have 
therefore been limited in terms of maritime security. However, more 
recent, post 9/11, agreements have proved to be more explicit in dealing 
with these concerns.
For example, in the agreement establishing a joint zone between 
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe, Article 9 establishes a Joint 
Authority and lists its functions including the following specific clauses:
26 For a full analysis of these provisional fishery agreements see ibid., 107.
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(h) Controlling the movements into, within and out of the 
Zone of vessels, aircraft, structures, equipment and people;
(i) The establishment of safety zones and restricted zones, 
consistent with international law, to ensure the safety of 
navigation, petroleum activities, fishing activities and other 
development activities and the effective management of the 
Zone;
(k) The regulation of marine scientific research;
(o) The preservation of the marine environment...
(r) Requesting action by the appropriate authorities of the 
States Parties consistent with this Treaty, in respect of the 
following matters:
(i) Search and rescue operations in the Zone;
(ii) Deterrence and suppression of terrorist or other 
threats to vessels and structures engaged in 
development activities in the Zone; and
(iii) The prevention or remedying of pollution;27
Furthermore, under Article 43 dealing with security and policing in the 
Zone it is stated that:
43.1 The States Parties shall...jointly conduct defence or 
police activities throughout the Zone...
43.2 If and to the extend that either State Party shall fail to 
comply...then without prejudice to any other rights the 
other State Party may have, nothing in this Treaty shall 
prevent that other State Party from separately carrying on 
such activities to such an extent as it considers necessary 
or appropriate.
43.3 The States Parties shall consult with each other...
27 'Treaty between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao 
Tome and Principe on the Joint Development of Petroleum and other Resources, in 
Respect of Areas of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Two States' (21 February 2001), 
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43.4 This article is without prejudice to any other basis for 
the conduct of defence or police activities which either State 
Party may have under international law.28
Similarly, the Timor Sea Treaty establishing a Joint Petroleum 
Development Area between Australia and Timor-Leste contains specific 
provisions in respect of both surveillance and security:
Article 18. Surveillance
(a) For the purposes of this Treaty, Australia and East Timor 
shall have the right to undertake surveillance activities.
(b) Australia and East Timor shall cooperate on and 
coordinate any surveillance activities carried out in 
accordance with paragraph (a).
(c) Australia and East Timor shall exchange information 
derived from any surveillance activities carried out in 
accordance with paragraph (a).
Article 19. Security measures
(a) Australia and East Timor shall exchange information 
on likely threats to, or security incidents relating to, 
exploration of petroleum resources in the JPDA.
(b) Australia and East Timor shall make arrangements for 
responding to security incidents in the JPDA.29
While these provisions are broad indeed they do show how "provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature" can address issues other than the 
exploitation and management of seabed or living resources. It is 
increasingly likely that this will prove the case in the future.
An alternative way to address the issue of maritime security in zones 
of overlapping claims to jurisdiction, but one which avoids the need to 
enter into a formal agreement establishing a cooperative mechanism 
such as a joint zone, is to enter into informal operational arrangements.
28 Ibid., Article 43.
29 'Timor Sea Treaty7 (Dili, 20 May 2002), Articles 18 and 19.
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In circumstances where achieving even a non-prejudicial provisional 
arrangement of a practical nature is problematic, practically orientated 
operational understandings offer an alternative way forward. In this 
context the arrangements in place between the United Kingdom 
maritime enforcement authorities and their French and Irish 
counterparts for the policing of their respective "grey zones" of 
overlapping fisheries zone claims provide an excellent example of what 
can be achieved. Close contact is maintained between the operational 
units charged with patrolling the respective fisheries zones and they 
coordinate amongst themselves as to who will police the grey zones, and 
when. Where a vessel is apprehended fishing illegally, they are prosecuted 
under the jurisdiction of whichever state's enforcement patrol made the 
arrest. In this case cooperation is substantially aided by the fact that 
the parties are close allies with longstanding navy-to-navy cooperation 
in place and that the relevant rules and regulations are harmonised as 
part of the common EU fisheries 'pond'. It must be recognized that the 
scenario is substantially different in Southeast and East Asia. 
Nonetheless, such engagement at the operational level must be viewed 
as highly desirable and an ideal and laudably practical way to help 
ensure maritime security and enforcement in overlapping claims areas 
even in the absence of any formal agreement among the parties 
concerned.
Conclusions
Given the fluid nature of the marine environment and thus the way in 
which many marine resources transcend artificial political boundaries, 
as well as the transnational nature of many marine activities, it may 
seem odd to advocate a system of international maritime boundaries. 
Nonetheless, most states seem to prefer unilateral management regimes 
and this is reflected in the LOSC. While maritime boundary delimitation 
may not necessarily represent the ideal basis for integrated management 
of ocean affairs, it does represent the dominant approach adopted by 
coastal states to govern maritime rights and responsibilities. On this 
basis it can therefore be argued that maritime delimitation is preferable 
to broad zones of overlapping claims, competing activities and lack of 
coordinated ocean management. A comprehensive network of delimited
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maritime boundaries can therefore provide a clear framework for 
maritime surveillance, enforcement activities and thus maritime security.
Where maritime boundary delimitation proves problematic, 
however, the LOSC provides for "provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature" -  maritime joint development zones and cooperative 
mechanisms -  and this type of approach is increasingly supported by 
state practice. Indeed, Southeast and East Asia are leading the way in 
terms of applying this type of practical oceans management and conflict 
avoidance mechanism and this argues that there is already considerable 
practical experience and capacity within the region. This provides hope 
that the numerous remaining zones of overlapping claims in the region 
can be addressed in a similar manner. The way in which cooperative 
mechanisms have been adapted to address security concerns is also a 
positive development and a fresh opportunity as well as challenge for 
the states concerned.
Although joint zones or similar cooperative mechanisms should 
not be entered into lightly, they can be viewed as being preferable to 
contested overlapping claims areas. Nonetheless, the practical efficacy 
of such cooperative mechanisms, with regard to maritime security or 
any other function, is, ultimately, fundamentally dependent on the degree 
of genuine cooperation among the parties as well as their joint capacity 
to undertake the considerable responsibilities entailed.
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